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COMMENTARIES
Dead People in Torts:
A Second Installment*
Vernon X. Miller**
Actions for wrongful death and survival are a big piece of torts, but com-
mentators have shied away from them.' Perhaps potential authors have
pulled a page from the judges' book because courts cut death cases from the
common law. A cause of action died with the decedent.2  The implications
were many: an administrator could not litigate a personal injury claim
after an injured man died; nor could an injured victim sue a dead tortfeasor's
estate. When an injured person died as a result of a tort, members of his
family could not sue for their losses through the estate or in their own right.3
History and Background
How legislators moved to fill the gaps in the common law and how judges
responded to the remedial legislation is the heart of the story on death and
survival. It has been told before, 4 and this paper is not the place for a
repetition except as an introduction to a discussion of some vital recent case
law and some recent legislation. Legislators responded first to afford spe-
** A.B. 1923, LL.B. 1925, University of Minnesota; S.J.D. 1929, Yale University;
Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of The Pacific.
* "Dead Men" in the title of the first installment was too cozy. Many of the vic-
tims in death cases are females.
1. The best is Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043
(1965). See my first installment, Miller, Dead Men in Torts: Lord Campbell's Was
Not Enough, 19 CATH. U.L. REV. 283 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Dead Men in Torts].
Many years ago Dean Jones of Iowa wrote a careful study on the Iowa survival statute;
Jones, Civil Liability for Wrongful Death in Iowa, 10 IowA L. Rav. 169 (1925), 11
IOWA L. REv. 28 (1925). See also S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
(Rochester 1966).
2. This is one of the common law propositions everyone states. Even in Black-
stone it is hard to pin down. See Benning, J., in Shields v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349, 351
(1854) quoting Blackstone: "The public mischief is the thing . . . in these gross and
atrocious injuries, the private wrong is swallowed up in the public."
3. Baker v. Bolton, the grandfather of them all, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (N.P. 1808).
4. See Dead Men in Torts.
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cial protection to members of decedents' families in their own right. That
was Lord Campbell's Act on wrongful death,5 by which Parliament permit-
ted actions by personal representatives for the benefit of some family de-
pendents. The typical statute restricts beneficiaries to a surviving spouse
and some or all of the next of kin, to be preferred in order as in a statute of
descent. Even under Lord Campbell's Act, courts created another kind of
abatement. If the preferred next of kin died while the litigation was pend-
ing, the cause of action abated. 6 Neither the heirs of the first beneficiaries
nor the next of kin on the next alternate level could proceed with the law-
suit.
For many years and in most jurisdictions Lord Campbell's Act was the
only kind of remedial legislation in death cases. To supplement Lord
Campbell's Act today, there is some kind of survival act in every state.
More accurately, there is such a statute to cover claims against a dead tort-
feasor's estate, and in all jurisdictions there is some kind of statute supple-
mented by judicial administration to allow litigation for the benefit of estates
where a decedent has died as a result of a tort. In some states there is still
a gap, where an injured plaintiff dies from causes other than the tort while
litigation is pending.7 Frequently the separate statutes on wrongful death
and survival are published in different chapters of compiled statutes.8 There
has been little conscious codification, and there are still some unsolved prob-
lems about joinder of claims under the two kinds of statutes, 9 as well as some
serious problems on damages and statutes of limitation. 10
Remedial developments through case law have been hampered because
judges have seldom brought common law flexibility into the interpretation
of the statutes on wrongful death and survival. They have been blinded by
the maxim that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly
construed. But there are signs of change as indicated in some of the cases
that will be discussed in this paper. History is special in each jurisdiction.
5. Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
6. There is a discussion of this aberration in the first installment. See Dead Men
in Torts 308-09. Much of this has been cured by decision and by statute. Gray v.
Goodson, 61 Wash. 2d 319, 378 P.2d 413 (1963); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West
1971).
7. Idaho (see text below), Minnesota and New Mexico (see text and notes below).
8. In the District of Columbia Code (1967) Lord Campbell's Act is published in:
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2701 to -2703 (1967), the survival statute is published in D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 12-101 to -102 (1967).
9. In the District of Columbia there are two separate causes of action which can
be joined. Sornborger v. District Dental Lab., Inc., 266 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
See Landers v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 369 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. 1963); Deep Rock Oil Corp.
v. Sheridan, 173 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1949).
10. See Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Emmett v. Eastern
Dispensary & Cas. Hosp., 396 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
[Vol. 22:73
Dead People in Torts
Since lawmaking and judicial administration do not proceed everywhere at
the same pace, generalizations about trends must be tested against special
instances; but some judges and some legislators are moving to bring death
cases into the plaintiffs' world.
"Plaintiffs' world" deserves some words of explanation. It is an old theme
expounded by this commentator that the decade between 1915 and 1925
was a crucial one for torts. Before 1915, we were living in a defendants'
world. The community always gets the kind of tort law it can afford. Cas-
ualty insurance was not available for many individuals or small proprietors.
There were not many personal injury cases until the time of the railroads11,
the greatest acceleration in these cases came with the automobile. The de-
velopment of casualty insurance, especially the omnibus clause for driv-
ers of automobiles, was the greatest stimulus to litigation in the history of
torts. Before 1915, judges were hypercritical about evidence, prima facie
cases, proximate cause, and scope of employment. It was an era of
dismissals and directed verdicts. Judges and jurors were stingy with dam-
ages. There were statutory limits in many states on damages for wrongful
death. 12 Fifty thousand dollars was an unacknowledged ceiling in all per-
sonal injury cases.
13
Since 1925, however, tort lawyers and personal injury victims have been
living in a plaintiff's world. The compulsory omnibus clause statute in New
York became effective in 1924.14 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co.'5 with its
tight definition of proximate cause, was already out of date when it was de-
cided in 1928,16 and it has had little effect on the development of the case
law. In a plaintiff's era, more plaintiffs get to more juries on the basic issues
of proximate cause and negligence; and since the years immediately subsequent
to the Depression, more plaintiffs have been getting bigger judgments,
reaching six and even seven digits.
11. It is significant that the first fellow servant cases and the first death cases in the
United States were railroad cases. Farwell v. Boston and W. R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Metc.)
49 (1842); Murray v. South Carolina R.R., 1 McMullan 251 (S.C. 1841); Hubgh v.
New Orleans & C.R.R., 6 La. Ann. 495 (1851); Whitford v. Panama R.R., 23 N.Y. 465
(1861).
12. Ten states still have a money limit on damages for wrongful death: Colorado,
Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Oregon, Virginia, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin. For many years there was a ceiling of $10,000 in the District of
Columbia. Ch. 45, D.C. Code, 31 Stat. 1394-95 (1901). The ceiling was erased
in 1948. Ch. 507, § 1, 62 Stat. 487.
13. See Miller, Assessment of Damages in Personal Injury Actions, 14 MINN. L. REV.
216 (1930).
14. Ch. 639, § 1 (1924) N.Y. Laws 1187-88, N.Y. INs. LAW § 167(2) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1972).
15. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
16. See Dead Men in Torts 286 n. 10.
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The crucial decade from 1915 to 1925 had little effect on death cases.
Even now legislatures have not completely erased the ceilings on wrongful
death claims. 17  However, where ceilings have been retained, they have
been boosted.' The old attitudes about strict construction of death and
survival statutes were so well entrenched that judges were not affected by
the trends in other tort cases. But the tide has been turning, and turning
faster since 1969.
Common Law Flexibility in Idaho
The statutes on death and survival in Idaho are thin:' 9 there are two
short sections which the courts have administered as an abbreviated Lord
Campbell's Act.20 Damages can include expenses of the illness and death,
plus loss of companionship and support. 21 There was no survival statute of
any kind in Idaho until 1949, and then abatement was cured only when a
tortfeasor died before suit.22 Plaintiffs were protected against tortfeasors'
deaths in ordinary personal injury cases, property damage, and wrongful
death. Punitive damages were excluded. But the common law on abate-
ment still controls when an injured person with a pending claim dies from
causes other than the tort. The Idaho court confirmed that proposition in
1970, in Doggett v. Boiler Engineering and Supply Company,2' but saved the
lawsuit in spite of the common law.
Doggett has some interesting ramifications. First of all, it was a work
injury case. The decedent was permanently injured, in October 1966, in
an explosion of a boiler that was being installed in the plant where he
worked. He died of other causes, in August 1969, while his lawsuit was
pending. Third party actions were begun against the manufacturer and in-
staller of the boiler, and against the manufacturers of component parts. On
the merits, Doggett was a products liability case. Questions of jurisdic-
tion were argued and were resolved in favor of the plaintiff. 24  The trial
judge refused to permit the decedent's wife to be substituted as a party
plaintiff and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. Judg-
ments were reversed and the case was remanded once again.
17. See note 22 infra.
18. See ch. 801, § 1 (1971) Mass. Laws. The ceiling was boosted from $55,000
to $100,000. In all the other nine states the ceilings are higher than they were 20
years ago.
19. IDAHO CODE §§ 5-310, 5-311 (1948).
20. See Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 34 P.2d 957 (1934); Russell v. Cox,
65 Idaho 534, 148 P.2d 221 (1944).
21. Checketts v. Bowman, 70 Idaho 463, 220 P.2d 682 (1950).
22. Ch. 47, § 1 (1949) Idaho Laws 82, IDAHO CODE § 5-327 (Supp. 1971). See
Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, 151 P.2d 765 (1944).
23. 93 Idaho 888, 477 P.2d 511 (1970).
24. Doggett v. Electronics Corp. of America, 93 Idaho 26, 454 P.2d 63 (1969).
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How did the court do it? Idaho has a community property law, and ac-
tions for personal injuries to married persons are assets of the community.
25
If either husband or wife dies, the other may proceed to liquidate the claim.
The impact of this case in Idaho may not be great since it is a special kind of
case, but that is not what is important about Doggett. The technique of the
court is important. Strictly in terms of common law propositions, this was
not a common law decision; but it is common law in terms of the court's
creativity. The court wanted to save the case. Fifty years ago most courts
would have looked for reasons to support abatement. The case will not be
big if you think of six figures. It is not likely that the widow will be the
prime beneficiary of a judgment in the case because this one has the ear-
marks of a work injury third party action in which the employer's insurance
carrier has a claim for subrogation. But Doggett is a bit of statesmanship.
Expansive Judicial Administration
in New Mexico
In Stang v. Hertz Corporation,26 the decedent was a nun who died 15 days
after an automobile accident. The defendants were a car rental agency and a
tire manufacturer. Like Doggett, the case looks like products liability. The
statutory beneficiaries were her natural brothers and sisters. It was stipulated
by the parties that on the date of the decedent's death the statutory beneficiar-
ies would not have had "any reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from
her continued life." Nevertheless, an action was begun under the New
Mexico statute. (The singular form of "statute" is intentional. Does it
cover both survival and wrongful death? Stang and its predecessors give the
answer which we shall try to diagnose.) The personal representative was
not one of the statutory beneficiaries. She was a nun, a metiber of the de-
cedent's religious community who was the duly appointed ancillary admin-
istrator with will annexed. There were two steps in this case, one in the in-
termediate appellate court and one in the supreme court.
First of all, there is the New Mexico statute. 27 As it was drafted by the
legislature and as it has been construed by the New Mexico courts, the stat-
ute is a hybrid. Literally, it covers every kind of wrongful death case with
all of the survival aspects. Whether a victim dies instantaneously or whether
he lingers, there is always the potential for two kinds of claims: economic
loss to the estate, and special loss to members of the decedent's family.
Legislatures responded first to recognize the family interests. Frequently,
25. Muir v. City of Pocatello, 36 Idaho 532, 212 P. 345 (1922).
26. 81 N.M. 69, 463 P.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1969) and 81 N.M. 348, 467 P.2d 14
(1970).
27. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-20-1 to 22-20-3 and § 22-20-4 (Supp. 1971).
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economic loss to the estate is slight, just funeral expenses in cases of instan-
taneous death. By accident, by fiction, and sometimes by delayed legis-
lative action to eliminate exceptions from a general statute, legislators and
judges usually have permitted some kind of recognition for the interests of a
victim's estate. The story would be too long for spelling out here, but the
New Mexico experience is vital to an understanding of Stang v. Hertz Cor-
poration. It is epitomized in the text of the statute and in the decisions in
this case.
The statute is entitled "Death by wrongful act or neglect-Liability in
damages," and it is published in the chapter on "Wrongful Death-Actions
for Damages." It is a statute on plaintiffs' actions when a victim has died
because of a tort. The first section is typically wrongful death-a boiler
plate from Lord Campbell's Act. While section two is a statute of limita-
tions, it was not until 1961 that the legislature made explicit that the time
when a cause of action arises "shall be the date of death." 28  Before 1961,
the courts had construed "time" to be the date of the injury. Section three
includes the specifics. Section four is an extra leg, and covers death actions
against common carriers. Before 1955, damages in death cases against these
defendants were punitive. 29  A sum was fixed as the price of each death,
and plaintiffs were the named beneficiaries . 0  Now the text of section four
has been accommodated to the specifics in section three, although the
named beneficiaries must qualify as plaintiffs unless none of them survive
the decedent.81 In that case the action is begun by a personal representa-
tive as in section three.
Section three with the specifics is the vital text. An action shall be liti-
gated by a personal representative. Damages shall be fair and just (not
very specific); they can be compensatory and exemplary; the jury shall take
into consideration the pecuniary injuries resulting to the persons interested in
the action, and the jury will have regard to the mitigating or aggravating cir-
cumstances of the tort. Proceeds will be distributed to certain preferred
relatives on alternate levels of relationship. If none of these persons survive
the decedent, the proceeds shall be disposed of "in the manner authorized by
the law for the disposition of personal property of deceased persons." The
proceeds of a judgment are protected against the decedent's creditors only
when the money can be divided among the named relatives.
28. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-20-2 (Supp. 1971).
29. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-20-4 (Supp. 1971).
30. Tauch v. Ferguson-Steere Motor Company, 62 N.M. 429, 312 P.2d 83 (1957).
31. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-20-4 (Supp. 1971). Actions against common carriers
must be brought under Section 4. In re Reilly's Estate, 63 N.M. 352, 319 P.2d 1069
(1957).
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The specifics do not include everything. The text about named bene-
ficiaries and pecuniary losses is typically Lord Campbell, but the section
leaves open other possibilities for damages. Nothing is prescribed literally
about expense, pain and suffering, or value of the life to the estate, all of
which sound like measures for losses to the estate, and the New Mexico
courts have exploited all of them, measuring value of life to the estate by
what a decedent would have earned had he lived. 32 Conceivably these are
items within the description of what is fair and just. Stang is the capstone
in the interpretation. Neither the legislature nor the courts have differenti-
ated between the interests of named relatives as statutory beneficiaries and
the interests of the same people or other next of kin as distributees of the
proceeds from the litigation. The hybrid has not been identified precisely
for what it is: the only statute on both wrongful death and survival for
plaintiffs' claims.33 There is a separate statute under which injured victims
can reach the estates of dead tortfeasors.3
4
The action in Stang was begun by the two-hat representative to recover
under the statute for the value of the decedent's life to the estate, damages
for pain and suffering, for medical and hospital bills before death, and for
the reasonable expenses of the decedent's funeral and burial. The trial
judge dismissed the complaint. No action could lie because the statutory
beneficiaries had not suffered any pecuniary injury. The statute was pri-
marily wrongful death. Only when the statutory beneficiaries had suffered
a special loss could the other factors be added into the verdict. That de-
cision was reversed in the court of appeals and the judgment of the court of
appeals was affirmed in the supreme court. Apparently the obligation for
funeral expenses was conceded by the defendants because there is no dis-
cussion of the item in the appellate courts, but both courts opened the case
at the trial for everything-expenses of the illness, pain and suffering, and
value of the decedent's life to the estate-all that when the statutory bene-
ficiaries had suffered no special pecuniary loss to themselves. Does the
special status of this personal representative have any significance in the
scope of this decision and its impact on future cases? The court of appeals
suggested that it might have something to do with the claims for expenses
32. Cerillos Coal Ry. Co. v. Deserant, 9 N.M. 49, 68, 49 P. 807, 813 (1897).
33. This positive statement may need some second guessing. Certainly a tort claim
abates in New Mexico when a victim dies from other causes before he can begin an
action. There is no statute that saves that kind of claim but there is a survival
statute which protects pending lawsuits. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-7-4 (Supp. 1971).
The text is big enough to include personal injury claims. Perhaps that conclusion is so
obvious that no one has raised any question about the statute's scope. There is no case
law.
34. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-7-1 (Supp. 1971).
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of illness and pain and suffering, 5 but the supreme court found reason for
supporting claims like these, which smack of survival and not wrongful
death, in the comprehensive language of the boiler plate.36 The liability in
every such action (wrongful death), the court said, is for "damages which
the decedent could have recovered." Chief Judge Comstock of the New
York Court of Appeals tried unsuccessfully to sell his brothers that same
kind of interpretation in 1861. 3 7
The story in New Mexico does not begin with Stang v. Hertz Corporation.
Lawyers have lived with the New Mexico statute for many years, and they
have molded it to include survival as well as wrongful death.38 The only
damage item added in Stang was compensation for pain and suffering.30
Many years ago the state supreme court recognized the value of the life to
the estate as a measurable item which can be added to the proceeds for dis-
tribution to the statutory beneficiaries. 40 Expenses of the illness have long
been recognized. In Stang, the defendant's lawyers were arguing that ex-
penses of the illness are not covered by wrongful death, and that, since 1961,
the New Mexico statute is one on wrongful death and not a statute on sur-
vival. Both courts agreed that names are not important, that it is a matter
of custom and interpretation.
The new factors in Stang are the courts' allowing compensation for pain
and suffering, and their allowing litigation to proceed when statutory bene-
ficiaries have not suffered pecuniary loss. Both factors sound like survival.
The courts did not spell it out literally, but they did conclude that natural
brothers and sisters, who have not suffered any special loss, can split a pot
of damages compiled from estimates on expense to the estate, pain and suf-
fering, and the value of the life.41 It follows also from these decisions that
named beneficiaries, who have suffered substantial pecuniary losses, can
split a double pot with contributions from both wings of the statute, wrongful
death and survival. Perhaps lawyers in New Mexico will want to confirm
those possibilities. Perhaps they may want to think about a complementary
35. 81 N.M. at 77, 463 P.2d at 53.
36. 81 N.M. at 351, 467 P.2d at 16-17.
37. Whitford v. Panama R.R. Co., 23 N.Y. 465, 484 (1861).
38. See Hogsett v. Hanna, 41 N.M. 22, 63 P.2d 540 (1936); Henkel v. Hood,
49 N.M. 45, 156 P.2d 790 (1945); Kilkenny v. Kenney, 68 N.M. 266, 361 P.2d 149
(1961).
39. The court had rejected it many years ago. 9 N.M. at 49, 49 P. at 807 (1897).
Stang reversed the earlier decision.
40. Id. at 68, n.42, 49 P. at 807.
41. This is precisely what happened in Baca v. Baca, 81 N.M. 734, 472 P.2d 997
(1970). Baca was decided just a few months after Stang. The statutory beneficiaries
were grown brothers and sisters of the decedent. If there was any evidence on pecuni-
ary loss, there was no reference to it in the opinion. Judgment for $24,500 was
affirmed.
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integrated statutory scheme. There is a "Modest Proposal" in the conclu-
sion of this paper.
In Washington State
Warner v. McCaughan42 from the State of Washington is another case
where the supreme court effected a preliminary decision before trial.43 The
decedent was a 21 year old college senior who died in a hospital after a short
illness. Her parents sued in their own right as beneficiaries under the
wrongful death statute, and the father sued also in the same action as the
administrator of the daughter's estate. It was a malpractice suit against the
doctor and the hospital, and a products liability case against a pharmaceu-
tical company. Plaintiffs' counsel asked for everything: damages for con-
scious pain and suffering, disability, medical and hospital expenses, damages
to the estate because of the loss of life, and damages to the plaintiffs
because of the wrongful death. The trial judge struck everything from the
complaint except the claim for expenses for the last illness and the burial.
The supreme court second-guessed the trial judge on one item-the claim for
damages'to the decedent and the estate. The potential is tremendous
where the decedent was a 21 year old college student preparing for a pro-
fessional career.
The Washington statutes cover both facets of death cases, wrongful death
and survival. 44 All the sections are included in one chapter entitled "Survi-
val of Actions." The editing and classifying do not represent planned codifi-
cation. Most of the sections in the chapter are remnants of older statutes
that were enacted or amended in 1854, 1881, 1917, and 1927. A section
which is crucial in Warner was added in 1961 .45 Until that year, tort ac-
tions did not survive to plaintiffs' estates. The wrongful death statute still is
narrow. Beneficiaries are restricted to spouses, children, and dependent
parents. In 1953, the legislature enacted a special statute to permit litiga-
tion against the estates of dead tortfeasors. 46 In the 1961 statute, the legis-
lature declared that all actions shall survive to plaintiffs' estates and against
the estates of dead tortfeasors. The only restrictions on damages are in
42. 77 Wash. 2d 179, 460 P.2d 272 (1969).
43. The case was settled before trial for $25,000. Two insurance carriers contributed
to the settlement. Letter from counsel, November 10, 1971.
44. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4.20.005, 4.20.010, 4.20.020, 4.20.046, 4.20.050 and
4.20.060 (1962). See also § 4.24.010, a special statute covering actions by parents
when minor children are injured or killed. Ch. 4.24 is entitled "Special Rights of Ac-
tion." Loss of companionship is a vital factor under this special statute. Lockhart v.
Besel, 71 Wash. 2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967). Does the decision in Warner affect
cases under the special statute?
45. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.20.046 (1962).
46. WASH. REV. CODE ANNr. § 4.20.045 (repealed 1961).
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pain and suffering, emotional distress, humiliation, and anxiety suffered by
the decedent.
It is arguable that the court in Warner disregarded the limitations in the
wrongful death statute, that all sections in the chapter should be interpreted
as a unit, and that the act of 1961 was a supplement to the existing death
statutes. That is how the trial judge interpreted them. The supreme court
refused to interpret the statutes strictly. Instead, the court read into the
legislative history of the statute an intent to preserve causes of action.
4 7 All
resources of the estate can be exploited in the lawsuit except those which the
legislature has specifically prohibited. The most important resource is the
value of the life which has been lost. In this case, that means something
analogous to impairment of earning capacity. That is how the court did it
in Hudson v. Lazarus48 from the District of Columbia, which the Washington
court used to support its position. (Hudson, however, was a special case
where the statute of limitations had run on the wrongful death claim but
not on the original tort.)
In the immediate instance, Warner looks like a remedial decision. The
beneficiaries are the parents who are excluded under the wrongful death
statute. Wrongful death in Washington is unusually tight, since parents
must be dependent on the decedent. Perhaps the Washington legislature
may want to set the sights higher, but there are other effects from the War-
ner case that Washington lawyers may not like. The beneficiaries under
survival are the heirs of the estate, or under one like the Washington statute,
they could be legatees in a will. The heirs could be beneficiaries who have
not seen the decedent for many years. The legatees could be strangers to
the family. Damages would depend on who the decedent was, his age,
and prospects, and not on any special relationship between the decedent
and the heirs or the legatee. The statutory scheme in Washington is un-
usually cryptic. It is difficult to read much remedial intent into the text of
the 1961 statute. Warner, too, like Stang in New Mexico, could be the
stimulus for rethinking on death and survival and a redrafting of the statutes.
In Iowa
Iowa has never adopted a statute like Lord Campbell's Act. Instead, there
is a simple comprehensive section on survival which has been on the books
47. The case references are thin. For background see Harvey v. Cleman, 65 Wash.
2d 853, 400 P.2d 87 (1965) and Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wash. 2d 112, 426 P.2d 605
(1967). Before 1961, only actions which could be assigned at common law survived in
Washington to decedents' estates. Cooper v. Runnels, 48 Wash. 2d 108, 291 P.2d
657 (1955). Apparently that case was one of the stimuli to revision.
48. 217 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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since 1851. 49  Nevertheless, the legislature has added in another chapter
something from a typical wrongful death statute.50 If a decedent leaves a
spouse, children, or parents, the proceeds from the survival action are pro-
tected against the decedent's creditors. The principal item of damages un-
der the Iowa scheme is the loss to the estate. Impairment of earning ca-
pacity is not an adequate description of the loss. Estimated income, esti-
mated expense, life expectancy, and now estimated taxes, state and federal,
are all important for determining the amount of the estate a decedent would
have accumulated by the time of his death.51
Although loss to the estate was the vital measure for many years, there are
now two other measures just as important: loss of services to the benefici-
aries of the estate and loss of support. 52 Obviously these measures can be
most important when the distributees are members of the household, and
the legislature has restricted them to instances where the distributees are
children or surviving spouses. By one standard, the statute under which
these items are justified is old. It was first enacted in 1911 to cover cases
where decedents were married women.
53
A non-Iowa lawyer can miss some tricks in studying the Iowa history and
case law, but the origin of the 1911 statute seems to be cases like Nolte v.
Rock Island Railway.54  The decedent in that case was a young married
woman who was killed on a railroad train in 1910. The court's opinion was
handed down in 1914. The special statute was enacted in 1911, covering
damages in death claims where the decedents were married women. The
opinion and the result in Nolte explain the reason for the statute. Because
Mrs. Nolte was trained as a nurse and practiced her profession until her
marriage ten months before her death, and because she had preserved her
interest in her profession after her marriage, there was evidence which a
jury could evaluate for measuring the decedent's worth to her estate. The
court admitted that the case was special and that, in a case involving the
death of an ordinary housewife, a jury could not assume that she would ac-
cumulate any substantial estate before she died.
49. IOWA CODE ANN. § 611.20 (1950). This is the first section. There are two
others just as simple and direct. The right of civil remedy is not merged with the
public offense. § 611.21. Actions under the first two sections may be continued if a
defendant dies. § 611.22. See IowA CODE § 2502 (1851).
50. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.336 (Supp. 1971).
51. Donaldson v. Mississippi & Missouri R.R., 18 Iowa 280 (1865); Mallinger v.
Brussow, 252 Iowa 54, 105 N.W.2d 626 (1960); Adams v. Duer, 173 N.W.2d 100
(Iowa 1969).
52. IowA CODE ANN. § 613.15 (Supp. 1971).
53. Ch. 163, § 1 (1911) Iowa Laws 183, IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.15 (Supp. 1971).
54. 165 Iowa 721, 147 N.W. 192 (1914).
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In the 1911 statute, the legislature provided that the administrator could
recover for the value of the married woman's services as a wife or mother,
expenses before death, and punitive damages "where warranted." A ceil-
ing was fixed at $6,000. In 1941, the statute was redrafted. 55  Disabilities
and restrictions were erased in any lawsuit where a married woman is a
plaintiff or where an administrator of a married woman's estate is suing
for wrongful death. The legislature was specific. Damages should include
costs of the injury and the value of the decedent's services as a wife or
mother. The ceiling on damages was removed. Damages under the statute
in death cases could be substantial. In Hamdorf v. Corrie,56 a verdict and
judgment for $20,000 was affirmed. That was in 1960, and according to
one commentator,5 7 it was the largest judgment under the statute up to that
time.
This special statute was amended in 1965.58 The potent addition to the
text follows an "and": "And in the case of both women and men, such per-
son, or the appropriate administrator, may recover for the value of services
and support as spouse and parent, or both as the case may be, in such sum
as the jury deems necessary." Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines was waiting
in the wings. The supreme court let the statute apply retroactively. 59  The
judgment in Schmitt, which was affirmed in 1969, was the biggest in Iowa
history. 60 Schmitt was the prelude to Adams v. Duer.61 Both have sparked
the new dispensation for expert witnesses, sociologists, economists, tax ex-
perts, and family welfare advisers. These people are permitted to prospect
the future about economic development, inflation, capital savings, and ap-
praisals in dollars and cents of housekeeping and counseling services. In-
formation about taxes has been restricted to past experiences, but the seed
is there to permit tax experts to project estimates about future tax burdens
from past experience and anticipated economic growth.
In the Schmitt case, a husband and wife were killed instantly in a collision
with a transport truck. They left six minor children from three to 19 years
old. The judgment in the action for the death of the father was $302,500,
and for the death of the mother, $264,000. As a dissenting judge acknowl-
edged,8 2 that sum invested for the children would bring as an annual in-
55. IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.15 (Supp. 1971).
56. 251 Iowa 896, 101 N.W.2d 836 (1960).
57. Druker, The Question of Damages, 15 DRAKE L. REV. 107, 109 (1965).
58. Ch. 427, §§ 1, 2 (1965) Iowa Laws 808, 809; IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.15
(Supp. 1971).
59. 260 Iowa 556, 149 N.W.2d 789 (1967). The accident happened before the
effective date for the statute, but the action was begun after that date.
60. 170 N.W.2d 632 (Iowa 1969).
61. 173 N.W.2d 100 (Iowa 1969).
62. 170 N.W.2d 632, 666 (Iowa 1969).
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come more than the decedent parents would earn, and at the end of the last
child's life, if the investment were continued that long, the principal sum
would be intact. The judge might have allowed for the lawyer's contingent
fee and still come up with an estimate to make the price look good. Neither
Iowa nor any other state has had enough experiences with big judgments to
know how such sums can be absorbed by the community. Moreover, death
cases differ from personal injury cases. When a person's injuries are per-
manently disabling, he may have to pay doctor bills the rest of his life, and
his earning capacity can be impaired completely. He still has to pay for
his living. In a death case, doctor bills do not continue beyond death.
Minor children grow up and support themselves. Widows may remarry.
Most decedents do not leave estates measured in six figures.
The Adams case also involved a highway death. It was a work injury
case, and the probabilities are that it was an action against third parties in
which the employer's insurance company was entitled to subrogation. The
decedent was working for a utility company on a highway where signs were
posted to direct automobilists into a single lane. A truck and a private car,
approaching the spot where the decedent was working, did not slow down
in time to move into the proper lane. The truck piled into the car and
knocked it across the road into the decedent. The survivors were his widow
and minor children. The verdict and judgment were just over $100,000,
considerably less than the sums in Schmitt. Nevertheless, judgment was re-
versed because the trial judge had decided that income tax payments by the
decedent over the last five years were inadmissible. The supreme court dis-
agreed and set the stage for tax experts among the cast of expert witnesses.
An economist was permitted to offer his opinion of the value of the father's
services in educating and training the children, the value of his services in
performing work around the house, and his value as a counselor. The wit-
ness pinned his estimates to precise figures at present values of $11,414.42,
$35,981.34, and $7,753.30. And in addition, there were estimates as to
loss of support and value to the estate. This is another case where it seems
like quibbling to complain about mechanics for figuring price. The de-
scription of the event is so awful, this price was not unusually high for 1970,
and the survivors were a widow and minor children. Nevertheless, there is
something unreal about dollars and cents estimates down to the last digit
where the predictions are subject to so many contingencies.
This is a new trend in death cases. Perhaps the Iowa statute is made
to order for this kind of experimentation because the Iowa legislature has
encouraged speculation on value of services and support from parents and
spouses. Benefits are restricted to spouses and children. Maybe there is
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more room for speculation in death cases than in personal injury actions,
but the day of the economist and tax expert is coming for computing im-
pairment of earning capacity in all kinds of cases, now that there are no
acknowledged limits beyond which verdicts cannot go.
A Judicial Brake in Michigan
In Michigan the story is different. Recent judicial action has been restric-
tive, 63 and that action has sparked legislation. 64  In 1939, the legislature
codified death and survival 5 and tied the scheme through cross references
to the statutes on the distribution of decedents' estates. 60  The kind of sur-
vival covered in the statute is related to wrongful death. For estates of in-
jured victims who die from other causes than the tort, there is still a separate
statute.6 7 Instantaneous death created a special problem in Michigan before
1939. Whether the proper action was for death or survival depended on
the time of death.68 If a decedent lingered after the tort, the lawsuit had to
be a claim for survival. The idea of instantaneous death as some kind of
prerequisite or limitation in death or survival is a bogey which lawmen have
to slay. 69 If a wrongful death is instantaneous the economic loss is less.
Instantaneous death can have something to do with damages, but the po-
tential for a lawsuit is the same whether a victim lingers or dies immediately.
It is the same, that is, unless a court has manufactured a legal problem as
Michigan did before 1939.
The statutes on death and survival had to be cleaned up to cover all kinds
of wrongful death whether or not there is substantial economic loss to the
estate. Under the Michigan statute, actions are begun by a personal repre-
sentative. 70  If a decedent has lingered, the plaintiff can recover expenses
and damages for pain and suffering. In any event the plaintiff is concerned
primarily with the interests of the statutory beneficiaries. The statute in-
63. Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Co., 383 Mich. 251, 174 N.W.2d 836 (1970).
64. No. 65 (1971) Mich. Laws.
65. No. 297 (1939) Mich. Laws 687; MIcH. CoMP. LAWS § 600.2922 (1968).
66. No. 288 (1939) Mich. Laws 599-600; MIcH. COMP. LAWS §§ 702.114, 702.115
(1968).
67. MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.2921 (1968). The statute is sweeping and simple.
It covers both of the other kinds of problems, where claimants die from other causes,
and tort claims which survive the death of a tortfeasor. Where death is the result of
an injury, claims are litigated under the wrongful death statute.
68. See In re Olney's Estate, 309 Mich. 65, 14 N.W.2d 574 (1944); Micks v. Nor-
ton, 256 Mich. 308, 239 N.W. 512 (1931); Detroit United Ry. v. Weintrobe, 259 F. 68
(6th Cir. 1919).
69. Michigan was not the only state where lawyers had blind spots about instan-
taneous death. The list could be long, but see Fretz v. Anderson, 5 Utah 2d 290,
300 P.2d 642 (1956).
70. MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2922 (1968).
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cludes a plan for the distribution of the proceeds as in a statute of descent.
The trial judge in the tort action confirms the distribution. Also as a part
of the scheme, and by cross reference to the statute on distribution of a de-
cedent's estate, the personal representative can petition a probate judge to
approve a settlement of the lawsuit.71 The probate judge is advised to dis-
tribute the proceeds to those persons who are dependents of the decedent
according to the damages sustained by each. The words of art in the first
section of the statute from 1939 until March, 1972, were "pecuniary in-
jury."
' 72
Any kind of codification suggests good intentions. That the Michigan
legislature in 1939 killed the legalisms of instantaneous death was good, but
the act of 1939 was not all good. The text includes conventional boiler
plate. That the job was done in 1939 is significant. Not many lawmen
then were ready for much remedial legislation on death. Lawyers still as-
sociated statutory schemes on death and survival as some kind of action in
derogation of the common law. The vocabulary in this kind of statute had
to be stereotyped in 1939. Perhaps "pecuniary injury" is no worse than
"loss of services" and "loss of support," but it sounds constrictive, and so it
was construed until 1960.7 3
In Wycko v. Gnodike,74 the Michigan court opened pecuniary loss to in-
clude something more than estimates based on monetary income. The de-
cedent was a 14 year old boy who was killed instantly when he was hit by
an automobile as he was riding his bicycle. His parents were the statutory
beneficiaries, and his father sued as the personal representative. On dam-
ages, the trial judge gave the standard definition of pecuniary loss where the
decedent is a minor. The jury should take into consideration what the mi-
nor would have earned before he reached 21 and how much the parents
would have had to spend to maintain him. The jury found a verdict of
$14,000. The trial judge cut it to $7,500 which the personal representative
refused to accept. He appealed to the supreme court. That court reversed
the judgment and the order for the new trial, directing the trial judge to
enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the original verdict. Judge Tal-
bott Smith wrote the opinion of the court. He did not go to bat on loss of
companionship, nor did he wrestle specifically with a definition of pecuniary
loss. He said that the worth of a member of the family can be estimated
in dollars and cents. Michigan lawyers were not slow to read into that de-
71. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 702.114, 702.115 (1968).
72. No. 65 (1971) Mich. Laws, effective March 30, 1972.
73. See Baker v. Slack, 319 Mich. 703, 30 N.W.2d 403 (1948).
74. 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
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cision something about loss of society and to introduce loss of companion-
ship into some death cases that otherwise might not be worth litigating. 75
Some Michigan judges have been waiting for the chance to spike the new
trend. Witness the prevailing opinion in Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Com-
pany,76 a 1970 case. The decedents, a man and wife, were killed in an
automobile accident. The woman was killed instantly, and the man lin-
gered for three days. The survivors were two married daughters. The de-
fendant admitted liability for the expenses of the burials and illness, but the
case was litigated because the daughters claimed substantial damages for
loss of companionship. The jury brought in verdicts for the personal repre-
sentative in each case: $15,000 for the mother's death and $20,000 for
the father's. Expenses for the mother's estate were $1,120 and for the
father's $2,550. The supreme court reversed judgments on both claims.
The court was split. Five judges signed the opinion of the court, two
judges dissented, and one concurred in the result. The opinion of the court
is unfortunate, not because the five judges did not have a case, but because
they were so anxious to sweep this one out of the scheme that they failed
to identify an area which Wycko created as an extended application of pe-
cuniary loss. In Wycko, the decedent was a member of the family who
lived within the family circle. Whether he was a minor or not could be
important on monetary estimate, 77 but whether he was young or old should
not cut the possibility for estimating value as long as he was living within
the family unit. The court in Breckon could have been explicit and could
have argued for that kind of understanding of pecuniary loss. But the
court did not do it that way. Reaction was not swift, but it has happened.
The statute has been amended. 78 Loss of society and loss of companion-
ship have been canonized; pecuniary loss has been erased. You can hear
them now-the witnesses in future cases-telling about the family visits
and the endearing correspondence, with all the hypocrisy, false sentiment,
75. Currie v. Fiting, 375 Mich. 440, 134 N.W.2d 611 (1965); cj. Reisig v.
Klusendorf, 375 Mich. 519, 134 N.W.2d 634 (1965); Wilson v. Modem Mobile Homes,
376 Mich. 342, 137 N.W.2d 144 (1965).
76. 383 Mich. 251, 174 N.W.2d 836 (1970).
77. See Currie v. Fiting, supra note 75. The decedent was a 21 year old daughter
living at home. Loss of society was an important factor for estimating damages, but
the case was remanded because the estimated figure was not reduced to its present value.
78. No. 65 (1971) Mich. Laws. Maryland has outdone Michigan. Pecuniary loss
is retained in the statute, but the legislature has added a string of other items: "mental
anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, pro-
tection, marital care, parental care, filial use, attention, advice, counsel, training,
guidance or education where applicable." Ch. 352 (1969) Maryland Laws 811; MD.
ANN. CODE art. 67 § 4 (Supp. 1971). The Court of Special Appeals has refused to
apply the statute retroactively. Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md. App. 531, 272 A.2d 57 (1970).
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and showmanship interested witnesses can muster. Breckon was not a stim-
ulus to codification; it sparked a questionable patchwork job.
Codification in North Carolina
In 1969, the North Carolina legislature enacted a simply worded and com-
prehensive statute on "damages recoverable for death by wrongful act."
' 79
Perhaps the statute is too comprehensive, but it is specific, and like Michi-
gan's and New Mexico's, it brings what could be litigated under two different
statutes into one scheme. This statute covers damages in death and survival
where death follows the tort. In North Carolina, as in Michigan, survival
in the other cases where the injured person dies from other causes is covered
in a separate section. 0 According to the new statute, damages .. . in-
clude: (1) hospital and medical expenses, (2) pain and suffering, (3)
funeral expenses, (4) present monetary value of the decedent to the person
entitled to receive damages (spouse and next of kin) including (a) net in-
come, (b) services, protection and care, (c) society, companionship and
comfort, (5) punitive damages if the deceased could have recovered them,
and '(6) nominal damages in any case. The statute is specific and com-
plete. There is not much room for interpretation.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has not yet had a chance to interpret
the statute, but it has refused to apply it retroactively."' It could be an un-
fair observation, because the legislators might have worked long and cau-
tiously, but the statute looks like a quick job without much analysis behind
it. It is loaded for plaintiffs. A generation ago lawyers might have needed
an omnibus scheme like this just to get enough into a death case to generate
adequate funds for a surviving spouse and children and enough to cover the
lawyer's fee. But not so today. This kind of statute can be the prelude to a
Schmitt case in North Carolina. The prospects look good for big verdicts
supported by all the new expertise from economists, sociologists, and tax ex-
perts.
An Anachronism from Massachusetts
Abatement in the common law sense is still alive in Massachusetts. The
Massachusetts court has always been conservative in torts. It waited 30
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174 (Supp. 1969). The basic death by wrongful act
statute was not repealed. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1966). Under that section
actions are begun by a personal representative. Assets are not liable to a decedent's
creditors, nor can they be distributed to legatees. Everything about damages has been
superceded by the new section.
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-172 (1966).
81. Smith v. Mercer, 276 N.C. 329, 172 S.E.2d 489 (1970).
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years to catch up with MacPherson v. Buick Automobile Company.8 2 Fifty
years ago, the court construed "negligence" in the death statute to be so tight
that the court could not stretch it to cover gross misconduct.a3 In 1970, the
court was still tight on death statutes and products liability. The case was
Necktas v. General Motors Corporation.8 4 Perhaps the products liability
part of the case is the most important to the profession, but to the parties in
the lawsuit the part on common law abatement was the killing punch. The
mother of the decedent had purchased a new automobile. The decedent
was driving it in the early evening, when the power steering failed and he
lost control of the car. It crossed the median strip and collided with an on-
coming automobile. Lawsuits were begun by the decedent's mother in her
own right and as the personal representative of the decedent's estate. She
was successful on her claim for property damage against the dealer for
breach of warranty, but she lost after verdicts in the Supreme Judicial
Court on all of her claims as the personal representative of the decedent's
estate. How did it happen? As personal representative she sued for negli-
gence against the dealer and the manufacturer and for breach of warranty
against the dealer. In Massachusetts her lawyer knew better than to argue
strict liability. To corroborate the inference from the happening of the
event about a defect in the steering mechanism, there was evidence after
the event that a reservoir in the steering unit was empty. Still the court
decided that the evidence was too speculative to support the verdicts on
negligence against the dealer and the manufacturer.8 5 The case for breach
of warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code could be processed
against the dealer. He was a merchant engaged in the business of selling
automobiles, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support a finding
about a defect, and the decedent was within the scope of option A in Section
2-318 of the Code.86  But-and this is a big but-the action for breach of
warranty does not survive under the death statute.
82. Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
83. Prondecka v. Turner Falls Power & Elec. Co., 238 Mass. 239, 130 N.E. 386
(1921). Even in 1956 the court was tight about gross negligence. Corrado v. New
York, N.H., & H.R.R., 333 Mass. 417, 131 N.E.2d 201 (1956). The Massachusetts
statute covers "negligence" and "willful, wanton or reckless" acts. MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (Supp. 1972).
84. 259 N.E.2d 234 (Mass., 1970).
85. There was a dissent. Two of the judges would have sustained the verdicts on the
negligence claims, and they would have sustained the car owner's claim for property
damage against the manufacturer on a breach of warranty because of the special
structure of the automobile business. They did not touch the abatement problem.
Id. at 239.
86. The Uniform Commercial Code. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 106 (1950).
Massachusetts has adopted Option A. See 106 § 4-318. The court did not spell it out
as I have done in the text. I have deduced my explanation from the scheme of the
Code. The opinion is cryptic. What was not enough evidence to support findings of
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Not much criticism can be added, beyond a simple statement of the case.
Even if the court had bought-an argument on strict liability against the manu-
facturer in a suit for a third party like the decedent, the court would have
killed the case. It was not within the language of the death statute. It is
not likely that this decision will be a stimulus to much legislative action.
At best, the legislature may add in the death statute some more words to
"negligence" and "wilful, wanton and reckless acts."
A Modest Proposal
Most of the action in recent years on death and survival has related to dam-
ages. Price and resources are the most important factors in the whole tort
picture. Even today, not all tortfeasors have the resources to pay for their
torts. It could be that the picture is worse than it was ten years ago. Cer-
tainly the risks of chance are more graphic now than they were a generation
ago. Judgments today are big, but there are still a lot of tortfeasors who
cannot pay for their torts. Big verdicts and judgments are creating a law of
diminishing returns. In some areas, insurance carriers cannot afford to un-
derwrite risks except at rates which prospective insureds cannot afford to
pay.s7 A million dollars is not an adequate award for a person who has
lost both eyes or two limbs or who is hopelessly paralyzed as the result of
a tort, but adequacy is not the only factor tort lawyers have to consider.
The costs of every tort are shared by the injured person, the members of
his family, his neighbors, and the tortfeasor's insurance carrier. An adjust-
ment at best is a compromise, and some of it has to depend on practical
economics.
Practically, high prices and tortfeasors without enough resources are driv-
ing the community toward no-fault. Death cases will be absorbed into the
new dispensation, but that new dispensation may be long in coming. In
the meantime lawyers can do some rethinking about death and survival.
What they do for conventional torts can be adapted eventually to no-fault.
Codification is not the key word. Redrafting is in order. Legislators can
find out what is happening in other states, but the time for patching holes
with boilerplate is gone.
negligence in the claims by the personal representative was sufficient to support an
inference of a defect in the power steering unit for the plaintiff in her own right
against the dealer. Any cause of action for the estate on a breach of warranty against
the dealer abated.
87. This can be hunch, and it is personal observation. See "Medical Malpractice:
The Patient Versus the Physician," a study submitted by the Subcommittee on Execu-
tive Reorganization to the Committee on Governmental Operations, United States Sen-
ate, November, 1969. "Introductory Statement" by Senator Ribicoff, 1, 2, 8-10; Re-
sponse to the Subcommittee from Aetna Life and Casualty, 1009, 1012.
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There is not any one blueprint for a statute that will be adequate in every
state. Local history cannot be ignored. But a model statute can look like
New Mexico's or Michigan's, not like their text or their plan, but like their
purpose. Survival is part of wrongful death when a decedent dies from the
injury. When death happens'to a victim from other causes, the problem
deserves a separate statute. The saving of actions against dead tortfeasors'
estates also creates another kind of problem and deserves a special statute.
Death because of the tort, whether it is instantaneous or not, is the crucial
area that deserves rethinking. Legislators have to be wary to avoid possi-
bilities for double recovery, to plug the loopholes which can excuse abate-
ment, and they have to devise a scheme under which it can be practicable
economically to litigate a claim that a defendant resists.
Two areas of interest deserve protection: the estate and the statutory
beneficiaries. Frequently the same people will be intrested in both, but it
will not always be so. A personal representative has to wear two hats. For
the estate he will try to recoup economic loss. For the statutory beneficiaries
he will demand compensation for loss of services and loss of support. The
statutory beneficiaries are the surviving spouse and the next of kin88 who
are members of the decedent's family circle, or who were dependent on
him for support. They can include relatives from several levels in the
hierarchy of the next of kin. Compensation for these relatives is special
for each class, and a piece of the verdict will be allocated to each group.
A relative in the family circle or one dependent on the decedent may be the
only next of kin in his class and he may die before the lawsuit is ended.
Until the verdict is confirmed after judgment and review, there can be an
abatement of that part of the total claim.
Loss of support and loss of services are abstractions that must be re-
duced to dollars and cents. One sounds like money, the other does not.
Adding loss of companionship and family affection is the road to double
recovery. When a decedent is a housewife, a minor child, or a spinster
who was a member of the family, there has to be some other damage item
than loss of support. Loss of services is closer to reality than family affec-
tion. You cannot have both.
Economic loss to the estate is the expense of the last illness and the fu-
neral, plus any loss of wages or comparable income between the time of in-
88. "Next of kin" needs definition. There can be a cross reference to the definition
in the statute of descent. There can be a special definition in the model statute.
"Next of kin" may be defined to include in-laws, adopted children, and related par-
ents, persons who are illegitimate, foster parents, and foster children. There is reason
to include everyone who lives within the family circle and specified relatives who are
in fact dependent on the decedent. The. practical probabilities are not as great as
they sound.
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jury and the time of death. It is a policy choice for the legislature whether
or not these assets of the estate, plus anything else by way of penalty, shall
be protected against the decedent's, creditors'and his testamentary disposi-
tion. s9 Certainly a part of the proceeds can be allocated to the special
creditors or to the persons who have paid the bills for hospitals, doctors, and
funeral. Compensation for pain and suffering and for disability are not as-
sets'of the estate. Even in personal injury cases these are factors which al-
low for expansive verdicts to support the costs of litigation. There is some
justification for adding them into a verdict when a person who has suffered
may enjoy some of the benefits, but to relatives who succeed to the estate,
proceeds like this would be a gift.
Value of the life to the estate is another shortcut to double recovery. In
a state like Iowa, where lawyers never dealt with anything like Lord Camp-
bell's Act, value of the life to the estate was a necessity to justify substantial
returns to relatives and to cover the costs of litigation. But in Iowa the
measure for determining value of a life was unreal. It was an estimate of
what a decedent would have accumulated by the time of his death. 90 Many
persons of modest means earn substantial wages, save little from their sal-
aries, and leave little property for distribution after death. If a statutory
scheme is geared primarily to the interests of the estate and not to the in-
terests of named beneficiaries, something like an estimate derived from
factors for measuring impairment of earning capacity can be a fair approxi-
mation of the loss.
There will be instances when there are no relatives or next of kin who can
qualify as statutory beneficiaries. In such a case, and Warner from the State
of Washington is typical, lawmen can be tempted to search for items which
seem to be fair under, the circumstances, but which can lead to double re-
covery when statutory beneficiaries have suffered a loss of support and loss
of services. That poses adilemma, but it-canbe solved. Fees in all death
cases can be fixed by the courts, and a personal representative can recover
in every case a statutory penaltyfor the estate.
Lawyers will complain about court-fixed fees, and they will rush to test
constitutionality. The solution is not that drastic, nor is it unusual. 91 These
89. "Estate" and "assets" mean "estate" and "assets" literally. These proceeds
will be distributed as assets of any decedent's estate and are distributed among next of
kin or legatees unless the assets are protected especially, in the statute against certain dis-
tributions. Under. the North Carolina statute all the proceeds from a death action are
protected against testamentary dispositions. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1966).
90. Donaldson v. Mississippi & Missouri R.R., 18 Iowa 280 (1865) and cases cited
in note 54 supra. . .
91. Fees are fixed now in death cases under the Oregon statute. OiRE. REV. STAT.
§ 30.075(2) (1971). See. the- New York cases: In re Peterson's Estate, 257 App.
1972]
Catholic University Law Review
are cases affecting decedents' estates. Lawyers are used to court-approved
fees in the administration of dead persons' estates. The fees will include a
standard percentage fixed by the legislature, 15 percent for example, plus an
allowance based on quantum meruit for services performed through the
appeal. Plaintiffs in personal injury actions now have little choice about
fees, but they can choose their lawyers, something defendants cannot do.
Under the model death statute plaintiffs will select counsel. Fees will be
standard and flexible. They will be assessed against defendants. But that
is not so different from what happens now, i.e., defendants' insurance carriers
underwrite the fees of plaintiffs' lawyers when the plaintiffs win.
Penalties in death cases are not new. Before 1955, the New Mexico
statute prescribed penalties in death cases against common carriers for the
benefit of statutory beneficiaries. 92  Under the Massachusetts statute, dam-
ages still are geared to culpability. 93 The amount of the standard penalty
will be fixed by the legislature. It could be $5,000, and it will be as-
sessed in every case litigated under the statute.
The model statute can be simple in text. Some of the propositions are
controversial. Conventional torts can dominate certain areas in the per-
sonal injury business for many years, but the future is going to be different,
and lawyers will have to re-appraise many of the ground rules. It could be
that the biggest bug in the model scheme is a conventional one, resorting
to loss of services and loss of support in the interest of statutory benefi-
ciaries. That can put us onto the Iowa merry-go-round. 94  We should
know how to get off because the profession has been building around those
factors for many years. 95 The Iowa practice cannot be controlled by legis-
Div. 449, 13 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1939); In re Applebaum's Estate, 41 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Sur.
Ct. 1943).
92. The old text is published in the current edition of the New Mexico Statutes
without the pocket supplement. N.M. STAT. § 22-20-4 (1953).
93. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 229, § 2, lines 8-10 (Supp. 1972). "* * * shall
be liable in damages in the sum of not less than five thousand nor more than one
hundred thousand dollars, to be assessed with reference to the degree of his (sic)
culpability-."
94. In the District of Columbia we are already on the merry-go-round. We have a
death case pending in the Court of Appeals where the judgment was entered for
$632,000. Beredice v. Doctors Hospital was decided in the District Court for the
District of Columbia last November (1971). The decedent was a young husband and
father who left his widow and two minor children (6 months and 2 years old).
Damages were measured by expense, loss of support, and loss of services. The key wit-
ness was one of the new experts, an economist.
95. See the instructions of the trial judge in Baltimore & Potomac R.R. v. Mackey,
157 U.S. 72, 92 (1895): "Now, manifestly, you cannot estimate in dollars and cents
exactly what the damages are in a case of this kind, if there be any at all. That is not
possible. But you may and you should take into consideration the age of the man, his
health and strength, his capacity to earn money as you discover it from the evidence,
his family-who they are and what they consist of-and then, gentlemen, from all the
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lation, but it can be reduced by judges. Unless judges will limit witnesses to
testimony about family status, size, age, and income, with mortality tables,
relying on the jurors' general experiences to help them evaluate the evi-
dence, absolute liability and standard schedules will be here in all kinds of
tort cases. Lawyers may not have time to learn how to capitalize on the
expertise of the new kind of astrologers.***
facts and all the circumstances, make up your mind how much this family, if anything,
probably lose by his death, and that would be how much had this family a reasonable
expectation of receiving; how much had they a reasonable expectation of receiving
while he lived, if he had not been killed." The instruction was ambiguous enough to
suggest tradition and purpose, and it was specific enough to suggest some facts which
the jurors could relate to their own experiences. That is the best you can expect in our
judge and jury system.
*** There is nothing in this paper on pre-natal injuries and stillborn bodies. That
topic is big enough for a short article. To anticipate my conclusions: these instances
would be excluded specifically in the model plan. Neither plaintiffs' lawyers nor par-
ents deserve two recoveries from one injury out of one event.
1972]
